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7 is the answer. The main purpose of the section 7 is to stop this growth
towards bigness in its incipiency and to foster competition. Congress
does not want to "wait and see" what the effects of the merger may be
before they find a violation of section 7, Clayton Act. If they were to
allow mergers of this kind, and not find a violation until the merger
showed the anticompetitive effects or until the company did use its
power to stifle competition, the entire purpose of the Act would be frus-
trated.
Thus, the Court has failed to distinguish between the various types
of mergers when applying section 7. It may be a bit inflexible to use one
test for all mergers, but it appears to be the best approach because the
aim of section 7 is to stop anticompetitive effects-the end results of
many mergers. In other words, if the proposed merger will substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, it should be stopped
regardless of the name accorded to it.
MICHAEL J. O'MELIA
Products Liability: Adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts (Second) in Wisconsin.
For products-liability cases we adopt the rule of strict liability in
tort as set forth in sec. 402A of Restatement, 2 Torts(2d),' pp.
347, 348.-
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Dippel v. Scianol used these
words in adopting the rule of strict liability in product liability cases.
However, it is questionable if the doctrine of "strict liability," as that
term is used in the Restatement' and elsewhere, was in fact adopted.
The plaintiff in Dippel sought to recover damages for personal in-
juries sustained when the front leg assembly of a large coin-operated
pool table collapsed, traumatically amputating two of his toes. Plaintiff
and two other men, allegedly at the request of and with the consent of
the defendant tavern owner, were moving the pool table to a position
1 Sec. 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
2 37 Wis.2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63; See also, Monograph, Brief Opposing
Strict Liability In Tort, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1966).
337 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
4 RESTATEIMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (1965).
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where it could be used. The plaintiff alleged three causes of action: (1)
negligence against the manufacturer of the pool table, the sales distribu-
tor, the amusement company that placed the table in the tavern and the
tavern owner; (2) an action against the tavern owner sounding in neg-
ligence calling for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; (3) a
cause of action against the manufacturer and the sales distributor alleging
breach of expressed and implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for purpose. The defendant's demurrer to the third cause of action
was sustained because of lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff
user and the seller. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed,
with leave to the plaintiff to plead over.
The court stated the issue as follows: "Is the lack of privity of con-
tract between the seller of the offending product and its ultimate user or
consumer fatal to the injured user's claim of strict liability in tort against
the seller ?"5 It was conceded that the law of Wisconsin required privity
of contract in an action for breach of implied warranty at the time of
this appeal.6 The trend, however, has been away from such requirement
and the Wisconsin court has recognized it. In Smith v. Atco Co.7 the
court said:
We deem that the time has come for this court to flatly declare
that in a tort action for negligence against a manufacturer, or
supplier, whether or not privity exists is wholly immaterial. The
question of liability should be approached from the standpoint of
the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent
person in the shoes of the defendant manufacturer or supplier.
Such an approach will eliminate any necessity of determining
whether a particular product is "inherently dangerous." If a
manufacturer or supplier is hereafter to be relieved from liability
as a matter of law by the courts, such result should be reached
on the basis that there was no casual negligence established
against the defendant rather than that the product was not in-
herently dangerous."
It should be noted that this statement applied to a tort action for negli-
gence against a manufacturer and did nothing to the privity requirement
in breach of implied warranty actions. However, the trend in Wisconsin
was established and the last brick in the foundation of the privity re-
quirement in implied warranty cases was removed in Strahlendorf v.
Walgreen Co.9
When this court declared by footnote in Smith v. Atco Co.'
that Wisconsin requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty
cases, it was merely stating the present status of our law. This
5 37 Wis.2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 57.
6 Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952); Ken-
nedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis.2d 100, 92 N.W.2d 247 (1958).
76 Wis.2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
s Id. at 383, 94 N.W.2d at 704.
9 16 Wis.2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962).
10 6 Wis.2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704.
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does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule forever,
regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or
authorities cited, in favor of changing it. However, we do not
deem the instant case a proper one in which to give consideration
to this question."
Thus, all that remained was the formal announcement of the collapse.
The reasons given by the court for not making the announcement in the
Strahlendorf case were given in the instant case.
Our reluctance to take the step in Strahlendorf has not proved
a mistake. Treading lightly, this court was slowly moving in the
direction of implied warranty without privity while others, in our
opinion, were doing so without due consideration of the legal
fictions they were creating.12
Warranty law had been so closely connected to contract and sales law
as set out in the Uniform Commercial Code that any "warranty not
arising out of or dependent upon any contract, but imposed by law, in
tort, as a matter of policy"' 3 was difficult to rationalize. What this "tort"
warranty does is to remove the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer,
and lack of privity along with the necessity of proving specific acts of
negligence and reliance on any expressed assertions. With the problem
now in perspective the court stated:
Whether or not this court waits for a case to arise under the
Code, the basic decision must still be made, viz: should products-
liability cases be treated as matters of implied warranty exclu-
sively, or is it properly a matter of tort liability.'4
The court used the words of Dean Prosser to provide the answer.
Why not, then, talk of the strict liability in tort, a thing familiar
enough in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities,
nuisance, workman's compensation, libel, misrepresentation, and
respondeat superior, and discard the word "warranty" with all
its contract implications ?15
Thus, section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) becomes
the legal basis for actions based on a claim of a defective product unrea-
sonably dangerous to a user. It should be noted that the court neither
accepted nor rejected any of the comments to section 402A because of
the narrow fact situation presented by the demurrer.
What then is the status of Wisconsin law under the principles set
down by the court in the instant case? It relieves the plaintiff from
proving specific acts of negligence and protects him from the defenses
of notice of breach, disclaimer and lack of privity. However, the plaintiff
must meet the following requirements of proof:
11 16 Wis.2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 830.
'2 37 Wis.2d 443, 453, 155 N.W.2d 55, 59.
13 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MIN N. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966).
14 37 Wis.2d 443, 455, 155 N.W.2d 55, 61.
15 Supra note 13.
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(1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the
possession and control of the seller,
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,
(3) that the defect was a cause (substantial factor) of the plain-
tiff's injuries or damages,
(4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling the product
or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent
transaction not related to the principal business of the seller,
and
(5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and
did reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition it was when he sold it.16
As a comparison, an action based on strict liability in warranty
would require the following as elements of plaintiff's proof:
(1) facts upon which warranty is based: manufacture, distribu-
tion, sale, bailment, or other transaction which give rise to
the warranty,
(2) identification of the type of warranty, expressed or implied,
(3) reliance where action is brought upon an expressed warranty
or implied warranty for a particular purpose,
(4) the facts and circumstances surrounding the breach of the
warranty, such as a defect in the product or lack of fitness
for the ordinary purposes for which such product was used,
(5) defendant's breach of warranty as the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury,
(6) notice to the defendant of the breach of warranty,
(7) injuries or damages.1 7
To understand the implications of the rule from defendant's view-
point it is necessary to establish on what theory of tort law the rule of
Dippel is based. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hallows clearly
sets out that the negligence doctrine is to be used and that the court has
not adopted "strict liability," "absolute liability," or any meaning which
these terms commonly connote. Justice Beilfuss, the author of the
opinion, uses the Osborne"' opinion to reach the negligence per se foun-
dation of the rule. He states that negligence per se can be founded upon
violation of statute or, via Osborne, upon violation of judicial law as
set forth by prior decisions of the Supreme Court. The instant case,
therefore, will be used as the origin for the determination of negligence
per se. Once plaintiff proves the elements necessary under the rule,
negligence as a matter of law follows. At this point all the rules and
theories of defense to a negligence action become available. Theses would
specifically include contributory negligence and its function within the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute. The plaintiff has the duty
to act as a reasonably prudent man in connection with the use of the
16 37 Wis.2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63.
1 Emroch, Pleading and Proof in a Strict Products Liability Case, PRAcTIciNG
LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION SERIES §§10:5, 10:12 (1967).
Is Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
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product. He must "use ordinary care to protect himself from known or
readily apparent dangers." 19 If be does not, and such conduct proxi-
mately contributes to his injury, his negligence must be compared to
the sellers and used to reduce or bar recovery. Assumption of risk would
be included in contributory negligence under the above definition.20 The
court specifically listed other defenses available to the defendant.
Defenses among others that suggest themselves are that the
product must be reasonably used for the purpose for which it
was intended; abuse or alteration of the product may relieve or
limit liability, some products just naturally wear out in such a
manner as to render them unsafe and as to others, the intended
use can be coupled with inherent danger .... 21
Therefore, it can be said that Wisconsin has adopted section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts (Second). However, as Chief Justice Hal-
lows pointed out,22 it must be understood that the words of the Restate-
vient section must be changed to fit the mold of Wisconsin law and the
intreptation intended by the court in its adoption. The words in sub-
section 1 of section 402A would therefore read, "is negligent as a matter
of law" rather than "is subject to liability for." This change eliminates
any hint of "strict liability" in Wisconsin as that is not what the court
adopted. The Wisconsin comparative negligence doctrine requires negli-
gence and therefore bars any rule of strict liability in torts. Chief Justice
Hallows emphasized this in the conclusion to his concurring opinion.
While the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, sec. 402A, imposes a strict or
absolute liability regardless of the negligence of the seller, we do
not. This same approach and reasoning of providing a solution by
favoring our comparative-negligence doctrine by adopting negli-
gence as a matter of law rather than strict liability was used in
the dog-bite cases.2 3
This implementation of section 402A will, under the court's definition
and present Wisconsin law, provide a workable solution to the confusion
that has existed in products-liability cases. Hopefully, courts in other
jurisdictions may use the Dippel case as the basis for establishing a
solid tort basis for so-called breach of warranty cases. In fact, this case
may well become the forerunner for the eventual removal of all products
liability cases from the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
THOMAS A. ERDMANN
19 37 Wis.2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63.
20 McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 N.,V.2d
14 (1962).
21 Supra note 19.
22 37 Wis.2d 443, 464, 155 N.W.2d 55, 65.
23 Id. at 464, 155 N.W.2d at 66; For a discussion of the differences between
absolute and strict liability see, Monograph, Products Liability-Implied War-
ranties, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE at 13,21 (1964) ; See also Nelson v.
Hansen, 10 Wis.2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960) ; "Wurtzler v. Miller, 31 Wis.2d
310, 143 N.W.2d 27 (1966).
[Vol. 51
